Mortgage modification: Mabry v Superior Court, 2010 by Bernhardt, Roger
Golden Gate University School of Law
GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications Faculty Scholarship
2010
Mortgage modification: Mabry v Superior Court,
2010
Roger Bernhardt
Golden Gate University School of Law, rbernhardt@ggu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bernhardt, Roger, "Mortgage modification: Mabry v Superior Court, 2010" (2010). Publications. Paper 327.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs/327
Mortgage modification:  
Mabry v Superior Court, 2010 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Borrower has private right of action to enforce mortgage lender’s duty to assess and 
explore options to prevent foreclosure.  
Mabry v Superior Court (2010) 185 CA 4th 208 
 
In 2006, the Mabrys refinanced the loan on their home, borrowing approximately $700,000. The 
lender assigned the right to service the loan to Aurora Loan Services. The Mabrys filed Chapter 
11 bankruptcy in September 2008, but the bankruptcy was dismissed in March 2009. Aurora 
asserted that in July 2008, before missing any payments, the Mabrys contacted Aurora to discuss 
options to avoid foreclosure, and that after the bankruptcy was dismissed Aurora made several 
attempts to contact the Mabrys. The Mabrys contended that Aurora never contacted them to 
discuss foreclosure options. 
 
On June 18, 2009, Aurora recorded and served a notice f default, stating that it had tried to 
contact the Mabrys, as required by CC §2923.5. On October 7, 2009, the Mabrys filed a 
complaint asserting that Aurora failed to comply with CC §2923.5 and sought a temporary 
restraining order to prevent the foreclosure sale. After the court issued the temporary restraining 
order and set a date for a hearing, the Mabrys amended their complaint, adding a class action and 
seeking relief for the entire class. The court granted the second temporary restraining order and 
set a date for a hearing based on the amended complaint. After each respective hearing, the judge 
dismissed the temporary restraining orders and, without making a finding of fact, concluded that 
the actions were preempted by federal law, that the Mabrys did not have a private right of action 
under CC §2923.5, and that the Mabrys were required to tender all payments owing to enjoin any 
foreclosure proceedings. The Mabrys then filed a writ ith the court of appeal. 
The court of appeal determined that CC §2923.5 allows f r a private cause of action because 
there is no alternative administrative mechanism to enf rce the statute; to deny a private cause of 
action would leave the statute without any enforcement mechanism. The court noted that CC 
§2923.5 requires the lender to contact the borrower in person or by telephone to assess the 
borrower’s financial situation and explore options before filing a notice of default. If the lender 
fails to comply with CC §2923.5, then the court hasthe power, under CC §2924g(c)(1)(A), to 
postpone the sale until compliance. This procedure me ts the statutory goal of forcing parties to 
communicate about a borrower’s situation and the options to avoid foreclosure.  
 
The court also determined that the borrower need not te der the full amount of the indebtedness 
before seeking enforcement of CC §2923.5. Because the statute requires the lender to contact the 
borrower regarding alternatives before beginning foreclosure proceedings, it would defeat the 
purpose of the statute to require the borrower to tender the full amount before bringing an 
enforcement action. Case law requiring tender of payment before seeking postponement of 
foreclosure proceedings arose in situations when a foreclosure sale could not be avoided absent 
payment of all the indebtedness. See, e.g.,Arnolds Mgmt. Corp. v Eischen (1984) 158 CA3d 
575, 205 CR 15. Civil Code §2923.5, however, creates  new right to be contacted about the 
possibility of alternatives to full payment of arrea ages. 
 
Further, the court determined that CC §2923.5 is not preempted by federal law. Though Aurora 
argued that 12 USC §§1463(a) and 1464(a) and 12 CFR §560.2 preempt state law regarding the 
operation of federal savings associations, the process of foreclosure has been a matter of state 
law. See BFP v Resolution Trust Corp. (1994) 511 US 531, 541, 128 L Ed 2d 556, 567, 114 S Ct
1757. Because there is no right to a loan modificaton under CC §2923.5, but only a right to 
postpone the foreclosure process, preemption does not apply.  
The court also concluded that the declaration requid under CC §2923.5(b) does not need to be 
made under penalty of perjury. The statutory language mentions a declaration without mention of 
any required oath. Because of the number of persons who may be involved in seeking to contact 
a borrower under CC §2923.5, it is logical to conclude that the declaration may track the 
statutory language and not have to be customized in ach case.  
 
The failure of the lender to comply with  CC §2923.5 does not affect title to the property after a 
foreclosure sale has been completed. California’s comprehensive foreclosure regulation is 
designed to ensure stability after the trustee’s sale. Nothing in CC §2923.5 provides that failure 
to comply causes a cloud on title and the only remedy for the borrower is a postponement of the 
sale before it happens. The court remanded the case to th  trial court for a factual determination 
of whether there had been compliance with CC §2923.5. The court also noted that the case was 
not suitable for class action treatment as it involved highly individualized facts regarding how 
many and what types of attempts had been made by each l nder to contact each borrower, 
making certification of a class impossible.  
 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: Presiding Justice Sills knows mortgage law so well, and writes so 
persuasively on it, that it is difficult for readers (other than losing parties) ever to feel motivated 
to disagree with him. Furthermore, his writing style often cleverly—especially in this case—
conceals the magnitude of the victory for lenders and the defeat for borrowers in construction of 
the mandated “assess and explore” prerequisites for trustee sales under CC §2923.5. 
 
Although the court’s opinion begins with the ringin assertions that borrowers do have private 
rights of action for lender noncompliance with the statute and that they need not tender 
payment of their arrearages to assert those rights, tho e holdings are rendered effectively 
meaningless when courts require only unverified pro fo ma compliance by lenders with pre-
notice of default niceties, and do not support class actions or damage remedies or the vacating 
of trustee sales when even such minimal compliance was lacking. Judicial relief for statutory 
disobedience is about as meaningless as the statute itself appears to be—brave language, but 
not much content. 
 
As a matter of statutory interpretation or public policy, it may be quite legitimate to conclude 
that postponement is the only remedy available to a def ulting borrower when its lender has not 
properly assessed or explored matters before starting foreclosure. But it is not very likely that 
this narrow recourse was mandated by the legislature only, as the opinion suggests, to avoid state 
foreclosure law coming into conflict with federal banking law. From the briefs, this 
consideration appears to have been raised by the court rather than the parties, even though 
nothing in the opinion intimated that a federal lend r was involved. Nor does the d la Cuesta 
due on sale issue seem that similar to the earlier for closure moratorium statutes to which it was 
compared. (Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v de la Cuesta (1982) 458 US 141, 73 L Ed 2d 664, 
102 S Ct 3014.) 
 
Further, on the question of appropriate relief, refusing to invalidate defective but completed 
trustee sales fits well within our general policy of sale finality, but that does not explain why an 
innocent borrower should also be denied monetary relief against the lender when the foreclosure 
sale had wrongly omitted assessment and exploration. If remedies were to be judicially implied, 
tort damages seem no less fitting than postponement. (Although the court explicitly avoided the 
question of attorney fees, it could come up again in any future postponement battle, given the 
universal presence of fee clauses in loan documents.) 
 
None of these issues is probably that important, given that CC §2923.5 only applies to mortgages 
that were recorded between 2003 and 2008 and that are subject to foreclosure sales that were 
commenced between September 2008 (its effective date) and 2013. But Justice Sills’s opinion is 
a learned and readable analysis, even if ultimately not entirely persuasive.—Roger Bernhardt 
 
